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bruce a. ackerman 
My Debt to Mirjan Damaška 
Mirjan walked into my life in the Fall of 1972. I was 29, he was 41, but both 
of us were at the beginning of our academic careers in America. I was a lucky 
guy. My DNA was programmed for standardized tests. This curious aptitude 
propelled me out of the Bronx to Harvard College and Yale Law School. I 
served as a law clerk for Henry Friendly and John Harlan, followed up by 
writing a couple of long articles, and, voila, this proved to be a recipe for a full 
professorship at the University of Pennsylvania. I was, to put it mildly, 
confident in my bright, shiny intellectual tools and expansive about the rich 
possibilities of life in America—in short, I was naïve, breathtakingly naïve. 
Mirjan had come to Penn via a different route. He was a leading participant 
in the liberalization of communist life during the “Croatian Spring” of the 
1960s—and had been bitterly disappointed by the repression that followed. 
With reluctance, he and his wife Maria had decided to uproot themselves from 
their beloved Zagreb. They were rebuilding their lives from the ground up. 
Mirjan looked on in disbelief as I happily babbled about the mind-blowing 
implications of John Rawls and Guido Calabresi for the study of law. Mirjan 
did not come to America to herald a decisive advance in jurisprudence. He went 
into exile to gain the scholarly freedom to reflect upon the great crises of 
legality of the twentieth century. His brooding Slav soul was a standing rebuke 
to my heady American optimism about the future. 
It was not a recipe for a marriage made in Heaven–but so much the worse 
for recipes. It was intellectual love at first sight, and soon enough Maria and 
Susan joined us to create a quadrilateral of friendship that has been a 
centerpiece of my life for more than thirty-five years. 
American legal education—then and now—is remarkably parochial. My 
student days at Yale Law School were a time of great intellectual ferment. 
Teachers like Alexander Bickel, Charles Black, Robert Bork, Guido Calabresi, 
Ronald Dworkin, Charles Reich, and Harry Wellington were engaged in an 
exhilarating conversation exploring the ultimate aims and nature of law. But in 
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all their teaching, the legal world beyond America was the merest blur on the 
horizon: England was a (partial) exception, but a great fog appeared at the 
Channel, and the Continent was permanently obscured from view. 
Until Mirjan entered my life. For him, comparative law wasn’t the learned 
accumulation of curious details from far-off places, or even the restatement of 
familiar platitudes contrasting adversarial and inquisitorial systems. He was 
engaged in a stunningly ambitious project—drawing on Weber and other 
social theorists to develop a profound reinterpretation of the Western legal 
tradition. The key questions, he convinced me, arose from the competing 
visions of the state and the competing structures of authority that had emerged 
in the West over the past millennium. The Continental world was dominated 
by an activist state that sought to impress one or another set of ideals on a 
recalcitrant society through a well-organized cadre of bureaucrats—selected 
first from the Church and later from increasingly secular universities. The 
English-speaking world, in contrast, was governed by the philosophy of a 
reactive state, which aimed principally to resolve disputes through a 
coordinated structure of local notables presiding over jury trials. Damaška 
insisted that we can gain a deeper understanding of Western law only by 
locating particular legal doctrines within these competing visions of the state 
and authority.1 
Damaška has, of course, developed these insights in classic works like The 
Faces of Justice and State Authority.2  But early on, I was convinced that his thesis 
had a far wider range of application. His insights were crucial in helping me to 
place my own understanding of the fundamental philosophical challenges of 
the late twentieth century. The West was moving beyond the classic 
dichotomies of the night-watchman state, on the one hand, and 
authoritarianism, on the other. American political philosophy was trying to 
define a middle way—elaborating principles of justice that respected freedom 
but insisted on a just distribution of educational and economic opportunities 
for all citizens. John Rawls is, of course, the most famous exponent of this 
activist form of liberalism3—and, as one of my tutors at Harvard College, he 
convinced me of the importance of this enterprise. During the early years of my 
lifetime conversation with Damaška, I was writing Social Justice in the Liberal 
State,4 which tried to develop further the philosophical foundations of the 
activist liberal project. As I talked with Mirjan, I became convinced that his 
 
1.  MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 16-46, 71-96 (1986). 
2.  Id. 
3.  See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
4.  BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). 
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evolving reflections enabled philosophical liberals to move beyond utopian 
speculation and consider the distinctive challenges involved in creating viable 
liberal states in the real world. 
His framework pinpoints the legal tensions that predictably arise as Anglo-
American systems try to negotiate the transition from a reactive state to a more 
activist liberalism. Damaška predicted that the Anglo-tradition of reactive 
governance by legal notables would be challenged by a rising cadre of techno-
bureaucrats charged with the task of correcting market failures and providing 
millions of citizens with the prerequisites of social justice.5 
And he was right. His brilliant books have helped us to appreciate the 
institutional and doctrinal tensions that result when activist bureaucracies 
challenge traditional judges, and when judges take on new activist tasks.6 As 
we talked about his exciting project over countless lunches, I thought that I 
might contribute something to the larger enterprise that Mirjan had pioneered. 
His work consistently emphasized the procedural aspects of the great transition 
to activist and bureaucratic modes of justice. But perhaps his focus on process 
could be supplemented by a parallel inquiry into the substance of legal 
discourse: Did the transition from a reactive to an activist state encourage 
American lawyers to talk about substantive law in a new way? 
This question has shaped my entire scholarly career, but Damaška’s 
influence is most obvious, perhaps, in my books Private Property and the 
Constitution7 and Reconstructing American Law.8 My central concern was to 
show how the substantive categories of American law were slowly transformed 
as the American state adopted more activist notions of liberal justice. Following 
Damaška’s lead, my argument was built around a dichotomy. I proposed two 
competing models of legal discourse: Ordinary Observing and Scientific 
Policymaking.9 Ordinary Observing tracked Damaška’s model of the 
traditional English speaking world of coordinate authority and the reactive 
state. In this legal universe, lawyers talk to juries in ordinary language, urging 
them to apply prevailing social norms to resolve the individual dispute 
presented at trial. Scientific Policymaking elaborated on the implications of the 
rise of a more activist and hierarchical style of government in twentieth-century 
America. In the legal universe dominated by Scientific Policymaking, lawyers 
no longer talk primarily to juries, supervised by gentlemen-judges. They 
 
5.  See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 147-48 (1997); DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, 
at 231-34. 
6.  See, e.g., DAMAŠKA, supra note 5, at 147-48; DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 231-34. 
7.  BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). 
8.  BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984). 
9.  ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 10-20. 
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instead talk to specialists in the bureaucracy and professionals in the judiciary 
about the best way to implement the large ideals of liberal justice that lie at the 
core of the state’s activist project. 
In the spirit of Damaška and Weber, I am dealing in ideal types here. The 
real world of American law represents fascinating, and often confusing, 
mixtures of Scientific Policymaking and Ordinary Observing. One great 
challenge is to clarify these discursive mixtures and to map them on to 
Damaška’s parallel work on coordinate and hierarchical styles of governance. I 
tried to provide a case study in Private Property and the Constitution, but, to put 
it mildly, there is a lot more to be done. 
At the same time, Damaška’s work raises a larger question. Following 
Weber, he emphasized the specialist ethos of rule elaboration that governed 
bureaucratic and juridical life on the Continent.10 But as we discussed the rise 
of the activist state, Damaška helped me see that Americans were developing a 
new form of Scientific Policymaking that was quite distinct from the 
nineteenth century legal science developed in Europe. The key sources for the 
new legal science were the “law and economics” movement and post-Rawlsian 
liberal philosophy. My book, Reconstructing American Law, tried to sketch this 
larger transformation in American legal discourse. The book explored how 
“law and economics” was providing a fundamentally new way to describe the 
factual dimension of the problems confronting the legal system. The new 
analytic scheme permitted lawyers to liberate themselves from “common-
sense” descriptions of problems that might persuade lay-jurors and to 
substitute a system of description that would impress a new breed of legal 
specialists trained in the use of social science and quantitative methods.11 
Moving from facts to norms, I explored how the methods of liberal political 
philosophy might be used by lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats to implement 
principles of social justice within an empirical understanding of problems that 
was compatible with cutting-edge social science.12 This distinctive mix of 
liberal political philosophy and “law and economics” was, in short, providing 
the rising activist state with the analytic tools it needed for the responsible 
pursuit of social justice and economic efficiency in a liberal political order. 
Reconstructing American Law was published a couple of years before 
Damaška’s Faces of Justice, and its preface contains a fulsome acknowledgement 
of Mirjan’s great influence. My shameless effort to ride on Damaška’s coattails 
did not have the desired effect. Although Mirjan’s book was recognized almost 
immediately as a classic, mine quickly dropped into obscurity. My call for a 
 
10.  DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 21-23, 54-56. 
11.  ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 46-71. 
12.  Id. at 72-104. 
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philosophical law and economics turned out to be a quixotic gesture in an 
American legal culture where Richard Posner’s reductionist version of law and 
economics became a leading paradigm. 
But perhaps we are witnessing the end of this era; perhaps the next 
generation will indeed witness a rebirth of the liberal activist state. Perhaps the 
next generation will find in the work of Amartya Sen,13 Ronald Dworkin,14 and 
Guido Calabresi15 an inspiring source for future developments. 
Only one thing is clear. We won’t be able to understand this struggle over 
the future of legal analysis without Damaška’s insights into the very different 
aspirations of the activist and reactive forms of government that coexist in 
America. 
Damaška’s work will become increasingly important over the next 
generation. The activist liberal state is on the rise throughout the world, and 
this development will provoke debates over the future of Scientific 
Policymaking in many countries. Up until now, Continental lawyers and 
scholars largely have been bemused observers of the alarming American 
Methodenstreit proceeding in mysterious Anglo-land. Whatever this debate may 
mean for America, the Europeans have been more or less content to continue 
relying on the older forms of legal science they inherited from the nineteenth 
century. But if I am right, liberal law and economics will have a much more 
general appeal to all nations struggling to define a “third way” between 
simplistic forms of laissez-faire and equally simplistic forms of governmental 
command and control. Little wonder, then, that advocates of liberal law and 
economics16 in Europe and Asia are challenging the older forms of legal 
rationality that Weber took for granted in his discussion of the European 
Rechtsstaat,17 and which Damaška took as the baseline for his comparative 
work. Although Weber’s lawyer-bureaucrat-judges of the nineteenth century 
were rule followers, the lawyer-bureaucrat-judges of the twenty-first century 
will be more intellectually ambitious. Using the methods of law and 
economics, they will be in a position to move beyond rules to a more principled 
form of decisionmaking, using political philosophy to gain a more refined 
understanding of the legal requirements of social justice and economic 
efficiency in a liberal state.18 
 
13.  See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992). 
14.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
15.  See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
16.  See, e.g., HANS-BERND SCHÄFER & CLAUS OTT, LEHRBUCH DER ÖKONOMISCHEN  
ANALYSE DES ZIVILRECHTS [COURSEBOOK ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CIVIL LAW] (1986). 
17.  See ANTHONY KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 50-64, 72-95 (1983). 
18.  ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 46-104. 
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We are, of course, at an early stage in this larger reorientation of legal 
theory and practice. The new challenge to Weberian thought will be resolved 
over the course of the next few generations, leading to many surprising hybrids 
and intellectual experiments over the course of the next century. These twists 
and turns will undoubtedly make Damaška’s efforts, and my own, seem almost 
childlike in their naivety. I can easily envision some legal antiquarian of the 
twenty-second century shaking his head in disbelief when he accidentally 
comes upon some moldy volumes by the two of us in the (last remaining) 
Library of Printed Books. 
But let me assure my friends in the twenty-second century that, however 
childlike our scholarly investigations may appear, my lifelong conversation 
with Mirjan has been a joy while it lasted, and that we wish them well as they 
confront the surprising transformations of the rule of law that lie ahead. 
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